This book is the fourth edited volume of a series on cognition in great apes and deals specifically with mental life in gorillas and orang-utans. It has four sections: (1) comparative evolutionary and developmental perspectives on gorillas and orang-utans (three chapters); (2) cognition and tool use (six chapters); (3) communication (four chapters); and (4) social cognition (five chapters) in gorillas and orang-utans. In the epilogue the editors attempt to bring the information in these sections together into a coherent comparative perspective.
In the preface the editors set out their aim: to move away from the chimpocentric approach to the study of cognition; that is, much attention has been given to, and much comparative work has been done using, chimpanzees (and bonobos) at, what the editors believe, the expense of gorillas and orang-utans. They attribute this imbalance to (1) the greater number of captive chimpanzees creating a large pool of study subjects, (2) the greater number of detailed field chimpanzee studies and (3) the appeal that chimpanzees have because of their 'humanlike' social (e.g. warfare) and cognitive (e.g. tool use) capacities. Whether these reasons hold on closer scrutiny is of less relevance than the fact that in general there is indeed a strong bias towards chimpanzees in the great ape behaviour database. For instance, in Swartz et al.'s chapter on mirror self-recognition the numbers of study subjects are (in declining order): 163 (79.1%) chimpanzees, 21 (10.2%) gorillas, 16 (7.8%) bonobos and six (2.9%) orang-utans. So, strictly speaking this book should have included bonobos, although the editors themselves seem to include them within this chimpocentric view anyway. Given de Waal & Lanting's (1997) book Bonobos: The Forgotten Ape, this hardly seems justified. In similar vein one could argue that gibbons and siamangs should have been included. The behaviour of these lesser apes may put the behaviour of both great apes and Old World monkeys in perspective.
So, the chapters are all directed at exploring the mentalities of gorillas and orang-utans. The chapters on tool use reveal that both use tools. However, clear differences exist as to the conditions under which they do so. Both gorillas and orang-utans have been observed to use tools regularly in captivity but rarely in the wild despite extensive observations (the same seems to apply to bonobos). However, in their chapter Fox et al. describe tool use in a wild orang-utan population living at the Suaq Balimbing Research Station, Sumatra, Indonesia. To account for their findings, they suggest a complex interaction between the likelihood of inventing tools per se (low) and maintaining the invention in the population, which is dependent on the ecological conditions (density of items that can be obtained with a tool and the success of tool-foraging effort per tool-manufacturing effort) and the social conditions (high density of population such that each individual will have ample opportunities to observe and learn about tool use throughout its life). Although this may explain the data from wild populations the question remains why this happens so often in captivity. The 'human caretaker environment', in which ample opportunities exist to observe the use of tools, and the 'ecological' conditions, in which ample opportunities and leisure time exist to invent tools, may be contributing factors (chapter by Boysen et al.) . This is an interesting area of research. In any case it is clear that individual gorillas and orang-utans do have the capacity to develop tools. To what extent they devote this capacity to other purposes under other conditions and why this is the case remain to be determined.
The chapters on communication are basically chapters about communication with humans using either (American) sign language (ASL) or 'visual symbolic language' (VSL). A most interesting chapter is that by Tanner & Byrne in which the development of gestural communication in a group of zoo-living lowland gorillas is explored. One question about ASL is whether it moulds on an ability that is present but rarely used or whether it needs a close enculturation with humans and thereby may create a new capacity, in which case the gestures become part of living in the 'human created niche'. According to Tanner & Byrne these gorillas do develop iconic and deictic gestures among themselves under these zoo conditions. The question still arises to what extent this is specific for such conditions. The last part of the book, on social cognition, is a collection of different topics such as mirror selfrecognition, deception, imitation, teaching and the development of play. The chapter on mirror selfrecognition by Swartz et al. is clearly directed at putting the gorillas and orang-utans alongside chimpanzees. Swartz et al. present a table of all studies on mirror self-recognition to show that no significant differences (chi-square test) exist between species as to the percentages of animals with positive scores, e.g. mark test (percentages, number of animals): chimpanzee 43%, 97; bonobo ?, no data; orang-utan 50%, 6; gorilla 31%, 13. However such tables are sensitive to whether all data are included (e.g. Kitchen et al. 1996 is missing (six of six chimpanzees showed a positive score)) or whether new data appear (e.g. none out of two gorillas in Shillito et al. 1999) . Furthermore, and more importantly, as we have discussed (de Veer & van den Bos 1999) such comparisons are justified only when the data are not confounded by for example differences in rearing conditions. For instance, in contrast to chimpanzees, it appears that only home-reared gorillas reliably show evidence of mirror self-recognition.
In both the preface and the epilogue the editors give yet another reason for this book: to demonstrate the usefulness of the cladistic approach of comparative data. Begun's chapter on this topic nicely explains the principles underlying this methodology. Cladograms are trees built on changes in character states in species of interest 
